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697 
ADVERSE DOMINATION, STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND THE 
IN PARI DELICTO DEFENSE – APPLICATION IN CASES INVOLVING 
CLAIMS OF ACCOUNTING MALPRACTICE AND CORPORATE FRAUD 
 
Laurence A. Steckman, Esq.* 
Adam J. Rader, Esq.** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP,1 a receiver, Robert W. Seiden 
(“Seiden” or “the Receiver”) sought to avoid a statute of limitations 
 
* Laurence Steckman is a principal attorney with Offit Kurman, PA and has been 
litigating securities and complex commercial cases for more than thirty years.  In 
July 2006, Super Lawyers Magazine identified Mr. Steckman as one of New York's 
first “Super Lawyers” in both securities and business litigation, an honor he has 
received nine times since then.  He has authored or been principal co-author of more 
than fifty published works on the law, and book chapters and a co-authored volume 
on philosophy and existential psychology.  Mr. Steckman pursued doctoral studies 
in philosophy at Columbia University prior to attending law school after he received 
undergraduate degrees summa cum laude in classic guitar and philosophy.  He 
graduated Touro Law School in 1988, with honors, and was a member of the law 
review, publishing on federal securities litigation.  He began his law career as a 
litigator in the New York office Shea & Gould. 
** Adam J. Rader is a principal attorney with the law firm Offit Kurman, PA and has 
been litigating and arbitrating complex commercial domestic and international 
business cases in state courts, federal courts, and arbitral fora for more than twenty-
five years.  He handles a wide range of civil cases, including matters ranging from 
international trade and extradition to trademark and Native American law.  He has 
handled high profile matters ranging from representation of a prominent German real 
estate developer in extradition proceedings to representing an Azerbaijani law 
professor accused of attempting to sell artwork allegedly stolen during World War 
II.  He recently defended a high-profile Russian oligarch fighting extradition to the 
U.S. to respond to allegations of Foreign Corrupt Practices and RICO violations in 
connection with India investments.  Mr. Rader is a graduate of University of 
Wisconsin Madison Law School. 
1 No. 18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018 WL 6137618 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), aff’d, 
796 F. App’x 381 (9th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc denied, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 
4005 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2020). 
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dismissal of his claims against several auditor firms which had 
provided services to a Chinese technology company, China Valves 
Technology, Inc. (“CVTI” or “CVVT”).2  The events giving rise to the 
claims occurred many years before the Receiver’s appointment and 
would, on their face, appear to have long been time-barred as a receiver 
takes any claim subject to defenses that could be asserted against the 
party in whose shoes he or she stands.3  However, the Receiver argued 
his claims should be deemed timely pursuant to the “adverse 
domination doctrine,” (the “Doctrine”),4 under which the limitation 
period may be equitably tolled subject to proof that a company’s 
defrauding officers/directors were “dominating/controlling” company 
business.5 
 
2 Id. at *6.  CVTI had been capitalized via a reverse merger.  A “reverse merger” is 
the acquisition of a private company by an existing public company.  The transaction 
is often undertaken so the private company can bypass the lengthy, complex and 
expensive process of going public through a traditional public offering.  See 
https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-reverse-mergers-and-how-do-you-spot-one-
4165740. 
3 See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. 473 (1893). 
4 The literature on the adverse domination doctrine is considerable.  See, e.g., 
Christine M. Shepard, Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari Delicto Defense in 
Auditor Malpractice Cases: A New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275 (2012); 
Michael G. Dore, Statutes of Limitation and Corporate Fiduciary Claims: A Search 
for Middle Ground on the Rules/Standards Continuum, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 695 
(1997); Michael E. Baughman, Comment, Defining the Boundaries of the Adverse 
Domination Doctrine: Is there any Repose for Corporate Directors?, 143 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1065 (1995); The Maryland Survey: 1993-1994, Recent Decisions The 
Maryland Court of Appeals, 54 MD. L. REV. 670 (1995); Christopher R. Leslie, Den 
of Inequity: The Case for Equitable Doctrines in Rule 10b-5 Cases, 81 CALI. L. REV. 
1587 (1993); Ashley Rosen, The Maryland Survey: 2001-2002: Recent Decisions 
The  Court of Appeals of Maryland, 62 MD. L. REV. 700 (2003); John R. Leonard, 
Case Comment, Corporate Law––Massachusetts Limits Tolling of Statute of 
Limitations for Breach of Fiduciary Duties in Closely Held Corporations—Aiello v. 
Aiello, 852 N.E.2d 68 (Mass. 2006), 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 295 (2007); Robert W. 
Thompson et al., The Limits of Derivative Actions: The Application of Limitation 
Periods to Derivative Actions, 49 ALBERTA L. REV. 603 (2012); Duane Rudolph, 
Workers, Dignity, and Equitable Tolling, 15 NW. J. HUM. RTS. 126 (2017); Emil 
Bukhman, Time Limits on Arbitrability of Securities Industry Disputes Under the 
Arbitration Rules of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 61 BROOKLYN L. REV. 143 
(1995); Matthew G. Dore, Presumed Innocent? Financial Institutions, Professional 
Malpractice Claims, and Defenses Based on Management Misconduct, 1995 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 127 (1995). 
5 Complaint, Case & Demand for Trial by Jury at 6, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. 
18-cv-00588 CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2018), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter 
Receiver’s Complaint]. 
2
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The Receiver further argued that even if he was wrong about 
the limitation/accrual, he should survive a limitation-based dismissal 
motion, anyway.  Had the shareholders brought a timely derivative 
action against the auditors, a motion to dismiss their claims would have 
been granted because, he argued, a derivative action brought by 
shareholders standing in the shoes of the same corporation that injured 
the shareholders would have been vulnerable to an in pari delicto 
defense based on the corporation’s fraudulent conduct and unclean 
hands.6  This would have resulted, he argued, in such derivative action 
necessarily failing, had it been brought, requiring, as a matter of law, 
that the shareholders be deemed to have lacked the “motivation” to file 
a futile suit.7  The Receiver concluded that Doctrine-based tolling 
occurs unless someone “motivated” to sue gains factual knowledge 
sufficient to timely interpose claims seeking redress.  Therefore, he 
urged, the shareholders must be deemed to have lacked “motivation” 
as they must be deemed to have known any claims they might file 
would be dismissed on grounds of in pari delicto.  According to the 
Receiver, the combination of the adverse domination doctrine and the 
in pari delicto doctrine had to be construed to render all his claims 
timely.8 
Part II describes the facts underlying the Receiver’s case, 
arguments made regarding the interpretation of the Doctrine and a 
hypothetical auditor-raised in pari delicto defense, and the trial court’s 
reasoning, resulting in a with-prejudice dismissal of the first-time-on 
pleading.  Part III describes the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
reasoning in affirming the trial court’s analysis and decision, clarifying 
the adverse domination theory and the proper application of the in pari 
delicto doctrine.  Part IV examines application of the in pari delicto 
 
6 Applicability of the in pari delicto doctrine as a defense in shareholder derivative 
actions has been the subject of several scholarly articles.  See, e.g., Shepard, supra 
note 4; Henry duPont Ridgely, Avoiding the Thickets of Guesswork: The Delaware 
Supreme Court and Certified Questions of Corporation Law, 63 SMU L. REV. 1127 
(2010); Maaren A. Choksi, Interpreting In Pari Delicto in the Wake of Kirschner v. 
KPMG LLP, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 44 (2010); Sandra S. O'Loughlin & Christopher 
J. Bonner, 2013-2014 Survey of New York Law: Business Associations, 65 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 641 (2015); Lee C. Buchheit et al., The Dilemma of Odious Debt, 56 DUKE 
L. J. 1201, 1258-59 (2007); Richard P. Swanson, Accountants' Liability, Theories of 
Liability, SN073 ALI-ABA 23 (ALI 2008). 
7 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 10, Seiden v. Frazer 
Frost, LLP, No. 18-cv-00588 CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2018), ECF No. 25. 
8 Id. 
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doctrine in the context of shareholder derivative actions, generally, 
where the adverse domination doctrine is at issue.  This section focuses 
on a leading case from the New York Court of Appeals, Kirschner v. 
KPMG LLP,9 in which an outside auditor asserted an in pari delicto 
defense in a shareholder derivative action, discussing how the Seiden 
litigation would have turned out if the rules in Kirschner had been 
applied.10  Part V discusses application of in pari delicto arguments 
not only in derivative actions, but actions filed by Bankruptcy Trustees 
or others who step into the shoes of adversely dominated corporations.  
Equitable considerations, the authors conclude, should figure 
prominently in evaluating potential applicability of limitation period 
tolling where adverse domination claims are interposed and in pari 
delicto arguments proffered in derivative litigation. 
II. THE FACTS, CLAIMS AND ARGUMENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT 
A. The Receiver’s Allegations of Auditor Misconduct 
Plaintiff Robert W. Seiden, Esq., the receiver for CVTI filed 
claims against several auditor firms (“Defendants” or the “Auditors”)11 
for aiding and abetting and/or negligently allowing the alleged 
common law misconducts of the officers and directors of CVTI, a 
China technology company that became a public entity, via a reverse 
merger.  The Receiver alleged that between 2008 and 2011, 
Defendants assisted CVTI in raising $64.7 million by repeatedly 
signing off on fraudulent documents.12  The Auditors were retained 
from January 2008 through September 2012 to audit CVTI financial 
statements, review SEC filings, and complete tax work.13  The 
Receiver alleged the Auditors failed to fulfill their engagement letter 
obligations to CVTI from January 2008-December 2012,14  by failing, 
inter alia, to properly report what the Receiver characterized as 
“obvious” related-party transactions, under PCAOB and GAAP 
 
9 938 N.E.2d 941 (N.Y. 2010). 
10 Id. at 945. 
11 The defendant firms were Frazer Frost, LLP; Moore, Stephens, Wurth, Frazer & 
Terbet, LLP; Frazer, LLP; and Frost, PLLC. 
12 Receiver’s Complaint, supra note 5, at 6. 
13 Id. at 7. 
14 Id. at 8. 
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standards.15  Neither details of the referenced misconduct nor existence 
of same was at issue in the dismissal motion practice that followed 
complaint filing. 
The Defendants were Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (“PCAOB”) registered audit firms with their principal places of 
business in Brea, California, except one auditor who had a principal 
place of business in Little Rock, Arkansas, but performed audit-related 
work for CVTI in Orange County, California.16  The Receiver alleged 
five causes against the Auditors: negligence and gross negligence; 
breach of contract; aiding, abetting, or participation in breaches of 
fiduciary duty; aiding, abetting, or participation in a fraudulent 
scheme; and unjust enrichment arising out of Defendants’ audit work 
between 2008 and 2012, which claims he pleaded were currently 
actionable.17 
On September 12, 2016, Seiden was appointed as Receiver of 
 
15 Id.  “PCAOB” is the common abbreviation for the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board which is a private-sector, nonprofit corporation created by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to oversee accounting professionals who provide 
independent audit reports for publicly traded companies.  “GAAP” is the common 
abbreviation for generally accepted accounting principles. 
16 Id. at 3. 
17 Among other things, the Receiver alleged the Auditors reviewed CVTI’s third 
quarter 2010 financial statements in connection with CVTI’s Form 10-Q.  Before the 
third quarter 2010 Form 10-Q was filed, CVYI’s CEO Fang allegedly informed 
Defendants about misrepresentations made by him in connection with an acquisition 
involving Changsha Valves including misrepresentations regarding: (i) the seller’s 
identity; (ii) the related parties’ role in acquisition; (iii) the acquisition price; (iv) the 
acquisition structure; and (v) the allocation of assets and liabilities. Id. at 14.  
Notwithstanding alleged receipt of the above information, according to the Receiver, 
the Defendants confirmed the misinformation in the first and second quarter of 2010 
but failed to take appropriate steps to communicate this to CVTI’s management or 
audit committee.  Accordingly, the Receiver maintained that the third quarter 2010 
Form 10-Q was filed with known misstatements. Id.  Despite the Auditor’s alleged 
awareness there should be “heightened skepticism” for the 2011 audit, they did not, 
he alleged, take appropriate steps which would have detected CVTI’s failure to make 
the $1.7 million VAT payment in connection with Hanwei Valve, which CVTI had 
recorded in its books.  That failure allegedly resulted in an audit report with an 
unqualified opinion for financial statements that overstated net income 6.22% and 
understated tax liability. Id.  The Receiver further complained Defendants failed to 
comply with “other contractual obligations” by performing independent testing to 
make sure no material misstatements were made. Id. at 14-15.  He also complained 
that the Auditors CVTI’s 2010 Form 10-K inaccurately stated the audit was 
conducted in accord with PCAOB standards and that CVTI’s financial statements 
fairly presented the Company’s position and results in conformity with U.S. GAAP. 
5
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CVTI by the District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County 
of Clark, in the action captioned Michael Markbreiter, et al. v. China 
Valves Technology, Inc., et al.18  On February 2, 2017, the Nevada 
Court entered a Final Order and Judgment against CVTI, which also 
set forth the general powers of Plaintiff, as the Receiver which 
included the “[a]uthority to commence, continue, join in, and/or 
control any action, suit or proceeding, of any kind or nature, in the 
name of CVVT . . . .”19 
Seiden’s complaint alleged that the limitation period was 
tolled as of the date he was appointed,20 and that “[t]he Receiver did 
not discover and could not have discovered with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence have discovered Defendants’ participation in the 
CVVT’s activities and the true nature of Defendants’ . . . injury 
suffered before his appointment” and that “Defendants’ wrongful acts 
. . . were inherently undiscoverable . . . until after the appointment of 
the Receiver and there is no basis by which knowledge can be imputed 
to the Receiver that pre-dates the appointment.”21  Nineteen months 
after his appointment, on April 9, 2018, Seiden filed his complaint 
pleading he “did not discover and could not have discovered with the 
exercise of reasonable diligence . . . Defendants’ participation in 
CVVT’s activities and the true nature of Defendants’ wrongful 
actions and the injury suffered before his appointment in September 
2016.”22  He alleged “the domination of CVVT by the executives who 
committed the bad acts with Defendants made the discovery of the 
bad acts by the Receiver impossible until sometime after the 
appointment of the Receiver and the removal of the bad actors,”23 in 
 
18 Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018 WL 
6137618, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018). 
19 Id.  In certain legal documents, China Valves is referred to as CVVT, rather than 
CVTI––the abbreviation CVVT is used herein in some instances to be consistent 
with quoted language.  Accordingly, CVTI and CVVT are used interchangeably 
throughout this article with both abbreviations referring to China Valves 
Technology, Inc. 
20 Receiver’s Complaint, supra note 5, at 3. 
21 Id. at 6. 
22 Id. 
23 Id.  Although poorly pleaded, the Receiver may have meant to allege (or should 
have alleged) that CVTI’s shareholders could not have discovered the wrongdoing 
prior to the Receiver’s appointment.  CVTI’s shareholders’ potential discovery––
despite the adverse domination––was certainly the issue upon which the court 
focused in evaluating the motion to dismiss the complaint. 
6
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other words, he affirmatively pleaded his complaint was timely and 
that the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to the Doctrine. 
 
 
B. The Receiver’s Adverse Domination Tolling 
Theory 
Because CVTI was allegedly under the control and domination 
of its wrongdoing directors, Seiden urged that the limitation period was 
required to be tolled until some point after the Receiver’s appointment.  
That point was not identified in the complaint but, presumably, it 
would have been the time the bad acts alleged could have been 
discovered so the Receiver could seek relief.24  All applicable 
limitation periods were tolled, he argued, notwithstanding the 
relatively short California limitations periods applicable to his 
common law claims.25 
Under California’s discovery rule, limitations periods begin to 
run once the plaintiff has notice or information of circumstances that 
would put a reasonable person on notice of wrongdoing and that the 
claims the Receiver alleged accrued “when the plaintiff . . . discovered 
all facts essential to his cause of action . . . when plaintiff either (1) 
actually discovered his injury and its negligent cause or (2) could have 
discovered injury and cause through the exercise of reasonable 
 
24 Id. 
25 California law was applicable because the subject agreements between CVTI and 
the Auditors all contained California choice of law provisions.  Plaintiff’s 
negligence and gross negligence claims were governed by a two-year limitation 
period under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 339(1) (West 2020).  His breach of contract 
and breach of fiduciary duty claims had four-year limitation periods under CAL. 
CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 337, 343 (West 2019).  His fraud and unjust enrichment 
claims were governed by three-year limitation periods under CAL CODE CIV. PROC. 
§ 338 (West 2019).  As Judge Carney would hold, citing City of Vista v. Robert 
Thomas Sec., Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 237, 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), “where [the] 
gravamen of [the] complaint is fraud, claims are subject to a three-year statute of 
limitations.”  Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018 
WL 6137618, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018).  The Receiver did not contest these 
statutes of limitations applied to his claims nor the fact that at least six years had 
passed before he commenced his action.  Rather, the Receiver asserted that the 
applicable limitation periods were tolled under the adverse domination doctrine and 
did not begin to run until the Receiver’s appointment in September 2016, which 
effectively removed the adversely dominating directors.  See Seiden v. Frazer Frost, 
LLP, 796 F. App'x 381, 382 (9th Cir. 2020). 
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diligence.”26  The Auditors submitted multiple court documents 
showing the facts underlying the Receiver’s claims were not only 
available to shareholders before he was even appointed, but that  they 
had already pleaded and litigated them in a securities class action 
litigation.27  The same facts the Receiver claimed were impossible to 
discover had been litigated, starting in 2011, seven years before he 
filed his complaint.28  The defense argued the limitations period had 
long ago expired, based on shareholder knowledge of the pertinent 
facts which were set forth in a publicly filed securities class case which 
had in fact been dismissed.29 
Seiden was appointed as a receiver in an action against CVTI 
insiders on or about September 12, 2016.30  His Complaint was filed 
April 9, 2018—more than eighteen months later. 
The question before Judge Carney, the trial judge, had to do 
with proper interpretation of the Doctrine upon which the Receiver was 
relying—Judge Carney stated the issue as follows: 
“The doctrine of adverse domination allows ‘tolling for 
claims alleging wrongdoing by those who control the 
corporation.’” In re Verit Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 61, at 
*2 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. 
v. Jackson, 133 F.3d 694, 698 (9th Cir. 1998)). The 
doctrine also applies to toll the statute of limitations in 
actions against third-parties. See Admiralty Fund v. 
Peerless Ins. Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 379, 390 (Ct. App. 
1983) (applying adverse domination doctrine in action 
against third-party insurance company where the 
plaintiff corporation asserted it was prevented from 
discovering its loss until its own “wrongdoer 
employees” were removed). “The doctrine carries the 
same requirement of notice before accrual is deemed to 
 
26 April Enters. Inc. v. KTTV, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421, 432 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
27 Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint at Exs. A-E to Declaration of 
Lawrence A. Steckman, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC 
(KESx) (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018), ECF No. 23, Attach. Nos. 2-6. 
28 Id. 
29 See Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 9-20, Seiden v. Frazer 
Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018), ECF No. 
23. 
30 Receiver’s Complaint, supra note 5, at 3.  See also Seiden, 2018 WL 6137618 at 
*3. 
8
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have occurred. As with the discovery rule, the test is 
whether plaintiff knows or should know of the claim.” 
Hecht v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 333 Md. 324, 352 
(1994). “When a plaintiff relies on a theory of 
fraudulent concealment, delayed accrual, equitable 
tolling, or estoppel to save a cause of action that 
otherwise appears on its face to be time-barred, he or 
she must specifically plead facts which, if proved, 
would support the theory.” Mills v. Forestex Co., 108 
Cal. App. 4th 625, 641 (2003).31 
Citing Allen v. Ramsay,32 the court explained: 
A receiver occupies no better position than that which 
was occupied by the person or party for whom he acts 
and the receiver takes the property and the rights of one 
for whom he was appointed in the same condition and 
subject to the same equities as existed before his 
appointment and any defense good against the original 
party is good against the receiver.33 
The judge in Allen further explained: 
The showing of excuse for late filing must be made in 
the complaint. Formal averments or general 
conclusions to the effect that the facts were not 
discovered until a stated date, and that the plaintiff 
could not reasonably have made an earlier discovery, 
are useless. The complaint must set forth specifically 
(1) the facts of the time and manner of discovery; and 
(2) the circumstances which excuse the failure to have 
made an earlier discovery.34 
The Receiver argued the reason the limitation period was 
tolled, as to him, was because CVTI management was engaged in 
fraud and would not sue itself (or the Auditors who supposedly 
enabled their fraud)—therefore, until the corruption ended, the 
Doctrine required the limitation periods be tolled, as to him.35  Judge 
 
31 Seiden, 2018 WL 6137618 at *5. 
32 4 Cal. Rptr. 575 (Cal. Ct. App 1960). 
33 Id. at 583 (citations omitted). 
34 Id. at 581 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
35 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at 6.  
9
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Carney, however, explained that to obtain Doctrine-based tolling, 
plaintiff must not only show that the wrongdoing directors/officers 
controlled the company, but he must also negate the possibility that 
an informed stockholder or director could have induced the 
corporation to sue for relief,36 by showing management’s control was 
so extensive as to preclude discovery.37  The assumption underlying 
the Doctrine is that “with control comes non-disclosure and without 
knowledge of directors’ wrongful activities plaintiffs have no 
meaningful opportunity to bring suit.”38 
The Defense submitted a table containing a side-by-side 
juxtaposition of relevant paragraphs of the Receiver’s complaint, 
against two previously dismissed federal class complaints (a pleading 
and repleading, after dismissal), as well as a previously filed SEC 
complaint against the CVTI insiders, and another SEC complaint filed 
against the Auditors.39  All the pleadings were publicly available.  All 
the facts were known to the public, at least as of January 11, 2011, 
through the “Citron Report,” in a published article attached to the 
Complaint.40 
These same facts formed the basis of a shareholder derivative 
action against CVTI, filed on September 14, 2011.41  This derivative 
 
36 Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 1984). 
37 See Admiralty Fund v. Peerless Ins. Co., 191 Cal. Rptr. 753, 759-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983) (“[T]he dishonest president and other high ranking officers controlled the 
[company’s] operations to such an extent as to preclude discovery, the tolling of a 
discovery of loss provision should be considered,” otherwise, the shareholders would 
receive no protection during the time the wrongdoers controlled the company.); 
Smith v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (“A statute of 
limitations tolls when a claim arises from a director’s or employee’s defalcation and 
the wrongdoers’ control makes discovery impossible.”) (emphasis added).  
Shareholder discovery of the facts of a fraud defeats adverse domination—tolling 
sometimes occurs but only where domination prevents discovery of wrongdoing.  Id. 
(citing San Leandro Canning Co. Inc. v. Perillo, 295 P. 1026, 1028 (Cal. 1931)). 
38 Hecht v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 635 A.2d 394, 402 (Md. 1994). 
39 Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint at Ex. A to Declaration of 
Lawrence A. Steckman, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC 
(KESx) (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018), ECF No. 23, Attach. No. 2. 
40 See also In re China Valves Tech. Sec. Litig., No. 11 Civ. 0796, 2012 WL 
4039852, at *3 & n.21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012) (discussing the Citron Report). 
41 The shareholder derivative action was stayed pending a decision on the motion to 
dismiss the Class Action claim against CVTI and was ultimately voluntarily 
dismissed. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint at Exs. J-K to 
Declaration of Lawrence A. Steckman, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-
00588-CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018), ECF No. 23, Attach. Nos. 11-12. 
10
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action, which did not plead any claims against any Auditor Defendant, 
was discontinued without prejudice and never re-filed.42  The trial 
court concluded, with respect to discovery: 
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff has properly 
alleged the domination of CVVT by the directors who 
committed the alleged bad acts with Defendants. While 
tolling may be appropriate in situations where there is 
such domination and control as to preclude non-
wrongdoing employees or shareholders from 
“discovery,” it is not warranted under the facts of this 
case. Plaintiff has not alleged, nor could he, that the 
directors’ domination and control of CVVT precluded 
discovery of Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing. Here, it 
is not controverted that there were several actions 
brought against CVVT and Defendants prior to 
Plaintiff’s appointment as Receiver for CVVT. These 
actions set forth factual allegations that give rise to 
Plaintiff’s causes of actions, and clearly put the public 
on notice of CVVT and Defendants’ wrongdoing.43 
To properly allege entitlement to Doctrine-based equitable 
tolling, plaintiff must establish such “domination” that interested 
parties must have been precluded from discovering the wrongdoing, 
disabling a motivated person from suing.44  Restated, plaintiff must 
“negate the possibility” that an informed stockholder or director could 
have known enough to sue for relief, within the limitation period.45  
Uncontradicted motion evidence showed the shareholders did discover 
the insiders’ wrongdoing and sued on the same facts the Receiver 
claimed were non-discoverable.  The same gravamen of fact was 
repeated in class and derivative suits and two SEC complaints, prior 
even to the Receiver’s appointment.46 
 
42 Id. 
43 Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), at 13, 2018 WL 
6137618, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF No. 32. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 12-13 & n.7 (citing Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 
873, 879 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
46 The Receiver cited Farmers & Merchants Nat’l Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d 1520 
(10th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that a jury issue should be held to exist as to the 
directors’ knowledge of wrongdoing but the facts underlying the fraud were publicly 
disclosed in 2011, and the shareholders sued based on them.  See Appellant’s 
11
Steckman and Rader: Adverse Domination
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center,
708 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 37 
C. The Receiver’s in pari delicto Argument 
The Receiver, however, argued that, as a matter of law, even if 
the shareholders knew about the wrongdoing, because a receiver was 
involved, he should prevail, nevertheless.47  His argument was as 
follows.  Under the Doctrine, the persons discovering the wrongdoing 
must be “motivated” to seek relief and, he argued, the injured 
shareholders could not be deemed “motivated.”48  According to the 
Receiver, had the shareholders sued the Auditors derivatively, the 
Auditors would have raised an in pari delicto defense.49  Because the 
shareholders would be suing derivatively, through a receiver, they (he) 
would be standing in the shoes of CVTI, the wrongdoing entity.  This 
would be true even though the claims were being brought by 
shareholders seeking redress for the Auditor’s alleged wrongdoing, 
permitting or encouraging the adverse directors.  In other words, the 
shareholders would be, in law and according to the Receiver, the 
“wrongdoers,” requiring dismissal.  Because the shareholders would 
have known their derivative action against the Auditors would be 
dismissed under an in pari delicto defense, the Receiver argued they 
must be deemed, in law, to have been “unmotivated” to bring a suit 
they knew they could not win, allowing Domination-based tolling to 
occur, despite actual discovery of the facts underlying the claims, for 
lack of a motivated person to sue for relief. 
The defense argued the outcome of the Receiver’s hypothetical 
shareholder derivative action was pure speculation and, moreover, his 
“lack of motivation argument” was inconsistent with the fact of the 
filing of the initial class suit, and the filing of an amended class 
complaint after the initial class claims were dismissed by Judge 
Kaplan, which showed the shareholders were, in fact, motivated to 
 
Opening Brief at 34, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 Fed. App’x 381 (9th Cir. 2020) 
(No. 18-561767), ECF No. 10.  The Defense argued that cases which refuse to 
dismiss claims with prejudice because knowledge is an issue of fact do not control 
cases in which shareholder knowledge is certain especially where those with 
knowledge did sue, in multiple pleadings, on those same facts.  See Appellee’s 
Answering Brief at 44, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 Fed. App’x 381 (9th Cir. 
2020) (No. 18-56176), ECF No. 17. 
47 See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 1-3. 
48 Id. at 17. 
49 Id. at 3-4, 10-11. 
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/8
2021 ADVERSE DOMINATION 709 
seek redress.50  Judge Carney rejected his (hypothetical) in pari delicto 
argument.  It would allow an injured party to sit by, not suing, despite 
knowledge of the facts underlying a fraud, based on his or her own 
speculation as to what a court might decide, if such a case were later 
brought, by a receiver.51  He held that an injured shareholder must take 
action to protect his or her rights or live with the consequences of his 
or her inaction, including potentially applicable limitation periods 
elapsing.52  The Defense also argued—and Judge Carney held “it is far 
from clear that this defense would have completely barred a 
shareholder derivative action against Defendants for the acts alleged in 
the Complaint,”53 a holding consistent with authority.54 
At oral argument of the Auditors’ dismissal motion, Judge 
Carney posed the following question to the Receiver: 
THE COURT: …the question I have for you is: The 
wrongful conduct is of the people in charge.  And if a 
derivative case is brought on behalf of the company 
because the people in charge are the alleged crooks, I 
 
50 The Receiver distinguished the redress sought in the previously dismissed 
securities class action litigation as being brought on behalf of the class plaintiffs, as 
individual, shareholders, and not on behalf of the corporate entity, itself.  Because 
class plaintiffs were not seeking relief on behalf of CVVT, those actions, he argued, 
should not preclude Receiver claims filed on behalf of CVVT as opposed to 
individual shareholders.  See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss Complaint, supra note 7, at 3 (asserting “[a]lthough generally based on the 
same bad acts, the claims previously litigated were direct shareholder claims based 
on securities law.”). 
51 See Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018 WL 
6137618, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF No. 32. 
52 Id. at *9. 
53 Id. at *8. 
54 The Receiver relied on Rosenfeld v. Zimmer, 254 P.2d 137, 138 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1953), which involved a fraudulent transaction in which plaintiff shareholders 
had unclean hands, along with defendant corporation Euclid Properties, Inc., which 
falsified loan documents to obtain funds to repay loans made by the Rosenfeld 
plaintiffs and another shareholder (Mrs. Coren).  It did not involve adverse 
domination, just a fraudulent scheme involving shareholders, who were bringing the 
derivative action.  Id. at 138-40.  “[P]laintiffs’ cause of action was barred by the 
doctrine of unclean hands of plaintiffs and defendant Euclid, the corporation on 
whose behalf plaintiffs instituted the present action,” and “[s]ince the evidence 
disclosed that plaintiffs and defendant Euclid had intended to and actually did 
misrepresent the facts to the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company in 
obtaining a loan from it, by which they hoped to benefit, they came into a court of 
equity with unclean hands.”  Id. at 138, 140. 
13
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don’t see how that doctrine gets applied to the plaintiff, 
because I have those cases all the time.  And if I am 
understanding what your saying is: The wrongful 
conduct of the defendants will prevent a shareholder 
who’s truly disinterested and independent from 
prevailing.  And I’m not following—why is that?55 
The Receiver’s counsel was unable to effectively respond to Judge 
Carney’s question.56 
Once CVTI’s innocent shareholders discovered the subject 
wrongdoing, application of in pari delicto to benefit the Auditors in a 
[hypothetical] derivative action would, Judge Carney reasoned, have 
been a perversion of the in pari delicto doctrine.57  It would prevent an 
injured shareholder from prevailing (on behalf of the company), 
through a receiver, against the wrongdoing directors and anyone 
allegedly aiding them.58  Judge Carney’s questioning made clear that 
it would make no sense to apply in pari delicto in a derivative case 
under these circumstances as it would punish innocent shareholders 
suing derivatively for CVTI  director misconduct and allow an auditor, 
if it had really engaged in wrongdoing, to be unjustly enriched 
(assuming arguendo it participated in a fraud).59 
The Receiver tried to save his claims arguing that whether 
CVTI’s shareholders would have been subject to the defense of in 
pari delicto required a fact intensive inquiry as to whether the 
wrongdoing of the managers should be imputed to the corporation.60  
 
55 Transcript of Proceedings at 17:19-18:3, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 
18-00588-CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2018), ECF No. 38. 
56 Id. at 18-20, 24-27. 
57 Id. at 24-27. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Judge Carney cited In re Amerco Derivative Litig, 252 P.3d 681, 694-97 (Nev. 
2011) (holding under Nevada law corporation directors’ actions are imputed to the 
corporation, remanding the action for a determination of whether the in pari delicto 
defense applied), and explained that “an agent’s acts will not be imputed to the 
corporation if the ‘adverse interest’ exception applies, which requires the court to 
determine whether the agent’s actions were ‘completely and totally adverse to the 
corporation.’”  Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), at 
17-18, 2018 WL 6137618, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018).  “The ‘adverse interest’ 
exception is ‘very narrow’ and includes actions such as ‘outright theft or looting or 
embezzlement.’”  Id.  “If the agent’s wrongdoing benefits the corporation in any way, 
the exception does not apply.  If the court determines the director or officer’s acts 
14
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Under California law, such determination requires the court to assess 
whether “(1) the public cannot be protected because the transaction 
has been completed, (2) serious moral turpitude is involved, (3) the 
defendant is the one guilty of the greatest moral fault, and (4) to apply 
the rule will be to permit the defendant to be unjustly enriched at the 
expense of the plaintiff.”61  Judge Carney stated he thought it far from 
clear the in pari delicto defense “would have completely barred a 
shareholder derivative action against Defendants for the acts alleged 
in the Complaint.”62  
Judge Carney noted that although the Receiver alleged 
CVTI’s former directors and officers entered into transactions to 
funnel money to their personal benefit, which could constitute a “total 
abandonment” of CVTI’s interest, the adverse interest exception 
would prevent the imputation of their acts to CVTI.63  The fact that 
CVTI may have benefited from some of these transactions, indicated, 
to him, CVTI was “not completely harmed by the transactions,” as it 
would have acquired ownership interest in the companies.64  If CVTI 
benefited, the adverse interest exception would not apply—and, thus, 
he concluded “It is too speculative to assume that the defense of in 
pari delicto would apply to CVVT’s shareholders.”65 
 
should be imputed to the corporation, it must then make a secondary determination 
of whether the defense of in pari delicto should apply to the action at issue.”  Id. 
61 Id. at 17 (citing In re Amerco Derivative Litig, 252 P.3d at 696); see also Maudlin 
v. Pac. Decision Scis. Corp., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724, 732-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
62 Seiden, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), at 17, 2018 WL 6137618, at *8 (C.D. 
Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF No. 32. 
63 Id. at 17-18. 
64 Id. at 17.  In fact, and in addition, the Receiver’s allegation is that prior to the 
disclosure of the wrongdoing and the theft of funds by the CVTI insiders, CVTI was 
benefitted by more than $60 million.  Receiver’s Complaint, supra note 5, at 2. 
65 Seiden, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), at 17-18, 2018 WL 6137618, at *8 
(C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF No. 32.  The Receiver appealed Judge Carney’s 
dismissal of his complaint. See Notice of Appeal, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. 
SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal. August 29, 2018), ECF No. 33.  He argued, 
in part based on an argument that the finding that his in pari delicto argument was 
“speculative,” should not have resulted in dismissal, but rather a determination by 
the trial court of whether, in fact, an in pari delicto defense against a shareholder 
derivative action would have been meritorious.  See Appellant’s Opening Brief, 
supra note 46, at 31-32.  Judge Carney was overly generous—consideration of the 
Maudlin factors shows a hypothetical in pari delicto defense, raised in a hypothetical 
derivative action, would likely have failed. See Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra 
note 46, at 33-40.  First, protecting the public and preventing wrongdoers from 
benefiting from their conduct, was absent as all alleged wrongdoing and all 
15
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Whether an action by CVTI’s shareholders against the 
auditors would have been successful, he concluded, was, in any 
event, not the point of the adverse domination doctrine regarding 
whether an informed shareholder or director had the “ability” to 
sue.66  Rather, he explained: “the mere existence of a potential barrier 
to suing” does not negate the “ability to enforce a corporate cause of 
 
transactions related thereto were completed by the time of public dissemination of 
the underlying facts in January 2011—applying in pari delicto would have injured 
innocent shareholders and protected those accused of wrongdoing, allowing unjust 
enrichment.  Id. at 34.  Second, preventing a shareholder derivative action due to in 
pari delicto or unclean hands would allow the auditor to retain the purported benefit 
of its wrongful conduct and thus be unjustly enriched at the expense of CVTI and its 
shareholders, which would make no sense.  Id. at 35.  Third, while an in pari delicto 
defense can be asserted in a derivative action, the defense “must not be applied where 
to do so would create an injustice.”  Hill v. Younkin, 79 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1969). 
[T]he fundamental purpose of the [in pari delicto] rule must always be 
kept in mind, and the realities of the situation must be considered.  Where, 
by applying the rule, the public cannot be protected because the 
transaction has been completed, where no serious moral turpitude is 
involved, where the defendant is the one guilty of the greatest moral fault, 
and where to apply the rule will be to permit the defendant to be unjustly 
enriched at the expense of the plaintiff, the rule should not be applied . . . 
. [I]n some cases, . . . effective deterrence is best realized by enforcing the 
plaintiff's claim rather than leaving the defendant in possession of the 
benefit; or the forfeiture resulting from unenforceability is 
disproportionately harsh considering the nature of the illegality. In each 
case, how the aims of policy can best be achieved depends on the kind of 
illegality and the particular facts involved. 
Maudlin, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 732 (citations and internal quotations omitted).  
Accordingly, the Auditors’ counsel argued that it was not particularly “speculative” 
how a court would have decided whether to apply an in pari delicto defense—it was 
virtually certain that it would have been denied.  Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra 
note 46, at 39.  The Ninth Circuit would likely hold that had the purported in pari 
delicto defense been raised, it would not have been viable under controlling 
precedent which holds that in pari delicto “must not be applied where to do so would 
create an injustice.”  Hill, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 512; Maudlin, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 732 
(“how the aims of policy can best be achieved depends on the kind of illegality and 
the particular facts involved.”); Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court, applying the 
same standards set forth in Maudlin, reversed a finding that an in pari delicto defense 
precluded a derivative action.  In re Amerco Derivative Litig, 252 P.3d at 694-97 
(reversing dismissal of derivative action in reliance on in pari delicto doctrine, 
holding collusion of corporate insiders with third parties did not deprive corporation 
of standing to sue third parties).  See also Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 
46, at 39-40. 
66 See Seiden, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), at 18, 2018 WL 6137618, at *9 
(C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF No. 32. 
16
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action.”67  He set forth the central question regarding the adverse 
domination doctrine: 
The central question animating the discovery rule, and 
the corollary doctrine of adverse domination, is whether 
someone could have discovered wrongdoing, and 
sought redress. To speculate as to the potential outcome 
of a wholly separate action is outside the scope of the 
adverse domination inquiry. Indeed, for the Court to 
determine whether CVVT’s shareholders were subject 
to the defense of in pari delicto would essentially 
require a mini-trial on the merits of another litigation, 
before the Court could address the merits of this 
action.68 
Record evidence of multiple prior litigations and public disclosure of 
the facts through the 2011 Citron Report showed the shareholders 
knew the facts, including the existence and effect of Defendants’ 
wrongdoing—“the majority of Plaintiff’s present allegations . . . 
provided constructive notice of Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing in the 
course of their auditing engagement with CVVT.”69  Judge Carney 
relied on the reasoning of In re Emerald Casino, Inc.,70 in which the 
Seventh Circuit held “the mere existence of a potential barrier to suing” 
does not negate the ability “to enforce a corporate cause of action.” 71  
In Emerald Casino, a Chapter 7 trustee had sued former casino 
officers, directors and shareholders for, among other things, breach of 
fiduciary duties in connection with the casino’s loss of its gaming 
license.72  The cause of action accrued in 2001, but the Chapter 7 
trustee did not sue until 2008, beyond the five-year statute of limitation 
under Illinois law.73  The trustee argued the Doctrine tolled the statute 
of limitations when the corporation was controlled by the wrongdoing 
officers or directors, but the trial judge held the Doctrine was 
 
67 In re Emerald Casino, Inc., 867 F.3d 743, 762 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying the 
Doctrine and rejecting plaintiff trustee’s argument that creditor’s committee lacked 
the “ability” to sue because it could not have successfully brought a derivative claim 
on behalf of the corporation for lack of standing) (citations omitted). 
68 Seiden, 2018 WL 6137618, at *9. 
69 Id. 
70 867 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2017). 
71 Id. at 762 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
72 Id. at 760-763. 
73 Id. 
17
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inapplicable because the Chapter 11 creditor’s committee had the 
knowledge, ability and motivation to sue before the case was converted 
to a Chapter 7 but chose not to do so.74  On appeal, the Chapter 7 trustee 
argued the committee was unable to sue because it did not have 
derivative standing to assert claims against the directors and officers, 
and therefore, the creditor’s committee was not “motivated” to pursue 
the lawsuit because a gaming license sale was pending during the 
period.75  The Seventh Circuit affirmed.  The fact that the bankruptcy 
court might have denied derivative standing to the creditor’s 
committee was insufficient to demonstrate the committee could not sue 
for redress.76  Even if the committee lacked the motivation to sue, that 
would not alter the outcome—“would-be plaintiffs must live with their 
choice.  A plaintiff d[oes] not lack motivation to sue just because its 
chosen course of action proved to be unsuccessful in the end.”77 
Judge Carney found the Receiver failed to meet his burden.  He 
did not show a sufficient basis to avail himself of equitable tolling 
under the Doctrine and he could not shield his claims from a dismissal 
by speculating how a possible in pari delicto defense would have 
turned out.78  He dismissed the Receiver’s claims, with prejudice, 
notwithstanding it was a first time on pleading.79  Nothing could 
change the dates of the relevant events including the dates during 
which the Auditors were engaged and the time the Citron Report 
publicly disclosed the gravamen of the factual case that resulted in, 
inter alia, the shareholder class action, naming one of the auditor 
defendants, nor subsequent multiple SEC actions and a derivative 
litigation, not naming the Auditors.  The Receiver appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit.80 





77 Id. at 763. 
78 See In re Verit Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 61, at *3 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
plaintiff did not meet the burden to invoke the adverse domination theory because 
the transactions at issue were disclosed in filings with the SEC, and the corporation’s 
largest shareholder sued the company’s directors for claims asserted in the plaintiff’s 
complaint). 
79 See Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), at 19, 2018 
WL 6137618, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF No. 32. 
80 See Notice of Appeal, supra note 65. 
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APPEALS 
A. Ninth Circuit Ruling on Adverse Domination 
On appeal, the two central questions, as in the trial court, were 
how to properly understand the Doctrine and, in particular, its relation 
to shareholder knowledge of facts showing wrongdoing and whether 
the in pari delicto defense, as the Receiver attempted to use it, should 
be construed to save his claims.81  The Defense began by setting forth 
the traditional formulation of the Doctrine:  “[I]t is generally held that 
an action for fraud committed against a corporation is tolled for the 
period that those responsible for the fraud remain in control of the 
corporation.  The principle does not apply after discovery of the fraud 
by a protesting stockholder.”82  In other words, shareholder discovery 
of the facts of a fraud defeats Domination-based tolling where 
domination is so extensive that it prevents discovery of wrongdoing 
sufficient to allow a shareholder to seek relief.83 
 
81 Specifically, the Receiver argued any shareholder derivative action against the 
Auditors, prior to the Receiver’s appointment, would have been subject to an in pari 
delicto defense.  See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 17.  CVVT 
shareholders would have had no motivation to bring a derivative action prior to the 
Receiver’s appointment, he argued, even if they knew of the corporate wrongdoing 
and the involvement of the Auditors, because such a suit would have been futile and 
subject to dismissal based on principles of in pari delicto.  Id.  Thus, even if the 
wrongdoing were previously discovered, the Doctrine would still serve to toll the 
limitations period until appointment of the Receiver, who would not be subject to the 
in pari delicto defense.  See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O’Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d 
17, 19 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[D]efenses based on a party’s unclean hands or inequitable 
conduct do not generally apply against that party’s receiver.”). 
82 Burt v. Irvine Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 417 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (internal 
citations omitted) involved the potential tolling of a limitations period when those 
directors responsible for the fraud remained in control of the company.  Id.  Although 
Burt did not involve a receiver, there is no special rule as to application of the 
Doctrine for receivers. 
83 See Smith v. Superior Ct., 266 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (citing San 
Leandro Canning Co. v. Perillo, 295 P. 1026, 1028 (Cal. 1931)) (one of the 
Receiver’s lead authorities for the proposition—“A statute of limitations tolls when 
a claim arises from a director’s or employee’s defalcation and the wrongdoers’ 
control makes discovery impossible.”) (emphasis added).  Smith also cited Admiralty 
Fund v. Peerless Ins. Co., 191 Cal. Rptr. 753, 759 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (“near 
absolute control can place the shareholder . . . in a position of incapacity, and may 
make discovery of any wrongdoing impossible . . . if . . . in fact the dishonest 
president and other high ranking officers controlled the Fund’s operations to such 
an extent as to preclude discovery, the tolling of a discovery-of-loss provision should 
19
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The Receiver relied on three cases showing, he argued, that his 
interpretation of the Doctrine was correct, namely Whitten v. Dabney,84 
San Leandro Canning Co. v. Perillo,85 and Damian v. A-Mark 
Precious Metals, Inc.86  His argument on appeal was that, even if a 
shareholder knows of actionable misconduct and has the ability and 
incentive to seek redress, under California State law, the limitations 
period is not tolled until the removal of the directors exercising adverse 
control.87  Accordingly, a shareholder or a later appointed receiver still 
gets the benefit of tolling to file his own claims, despite shareholder 
knowledge, as long as the adverse domination is ongoing, regardless 
of whether shareholders obtain knowledge of the wrongdoing prior to 
removal of the adverse directors and regardless of any statute of 
limitation.88 
The Receiver argued the cases Judge Carney cited in support 
of his decision were all improperly relied upon, namely Burt v. Irvine 
Co.,89 Smith v. Superior Court,90 Admiralty Fund v. Peerless, Inc. 
 
be considered.”) (emphasis added).  The Receiver contended these cases were 
inconsistent with his lead authorities, discussed immediately below. 
84 154 P. 312 (Cal. 1915). 
85 295 P. 1026 (Cal. 1931). 
86 No. CV 16-7198 FMO (SSx), 2017 WL 6940515 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2017). 
87 See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 24-27. 
88 The Receiver also advanced this argument in the District Court but, on appeal, 
focused more on Whitten, arguing Whitten treated the adversely dominated 
corporation as an “infant” under the law, without standing to sue and, therefore, the 
limitation period should be tolled as against an adversely dominated corporation until 
adverse director(s) were expelled, regardless of whether shareholders knew of the 
alleged wrongdoing during the adversely dominated corporation’s period of 
“infancy,” when the wrong-doing directors were in place.  See Appellant’s Opening 
Brief, supra note 46, at 21-23.  The Receiver urged that the doctrine of stare decisis 
should have compelled the District Court to ignore the large body of California case 
law from California’s lower courts which provided that statutes of limitations under 
the adverse domination doctrine are not tolled when shareholders of the adversely 
dominated company have knowledge of the basis for a civil action and an incentive 
to seek redress for the wrongful acts of those dominating the company.  Id. at 3-5.  
His theory regarding the predominance of Whitten was contingent on the Ninth 
Circuit concluding Whitten stood for the proposition that adverse domination created 
an absolute limitations toll, regardless of whether or when corporation shareholders 
had prior knowledge of the basis for claims of wrongdoing.  The Auditors disputed 
his interpretation of Whitten.  See Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 46, at 24-
30. 
89 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 417 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). 
90 266 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
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Co.,91 Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,92 Healthtrac, Inc. 
v. Sinclair,93 and California Union Insurance Company v. Am. 
Diversified Sav. Bank.94  All of these cases had held the Doctrine 
precludes tolling where, despite domination, shareholders obtain 
knowledge of the wrongdoing and have the ability and motivation to 
seek redress.  The Receiver argued each was wrongly decided because 
they did not follow what the Receiver called the “Whitten rule.”95  He 
argued these California Court of Appeals cases and cases before the 
Ninth Circuit must all be disregarded in favor of (his interpretation) of 
the California Supreme Court precedent, Whitten.  He also argued 
Ninth Circuit decisions in Mosesian and the district court decision in 
Healthtrac were federal question cases involving interpretation of 
federal common law, not California law and so both should be 
disregarded, under controlling California Supreme Court authority.96 
The Receiver’s central argument was that Whitten sets forth a 
bright-line, allegedly well-settled “rule” with respect to interpretation 
of the adverse domination doctrine, namely that if a company is 
controlled by principals accused of bad acts which harm the company, 
all statutes of limitations on claims against the company (arising from 
the bad acts) are tolled during such periods of domination, regardless 
of whether (and when) the company’s shareholders might obtain 
knowledge of the existence of potential claims and their ability to sue 
regarding same. 
The Auditors argued the Receiver’s interpretation was 
incorrect.  In Whitten, a shareholder was held by the trial courts to be 
time-barred from seeking relief because a different shareholder had 
become aware of the subject fraud but did not sue.97  The question was 
whether the first shareholder’s knowledge commenced the limitation 
period for the second shareholder, then unaware of the fraud and only 
having recently learned of the facts.98  The Whitten Court held the first 
shareholder’s knowledge did not bar the second from filing suit 
 
91 191 Cal. Rptr. 753, 757-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
92 727 F.2d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 1984). 
93 302 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1127-28 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
94 948 F.2d 556, 565 (9th Cir. 1991). 
95 See Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Robert W. Seiden, Receiver for China 
Valves Technology, Inc. at 12-20, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 Fed. App’x 381 
(9th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-561767), ECF No. 30. 
96 Id. at 14-15. 
97 See Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 46, at 25-27. 
98 Id. 
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because he was not in a position to know the facts underlying the 
fraud—the Whitten Court explained: 
It is susceptible of demonstration that the first 
stockholder knew of all these matters and that as to him 
this right of action may be barred.  Is this also a bar to 
the prosecution of the same action by another 
stockholder who has acted promptly upon learning of 
the fraud?  Clearly this cannot be so . . . . [E]ven if it be 
said (and in saying it we do not decide it) that such a 
complaint as this shows that the plaintiff stockholder 
has waited too long before commencing his action, and 
that therefore the plea of the statute of limitations must 
be sustained against his action, this does not operate as 
a bar to the corporate rights when prosecuted by another 
stockholder . . . .Whatever, therefore may have been the 
rights of the Providence stockholders to prosecute this 
action after notice, the right of these plaintiffs is not 
barred under their allegation that they first acquired 
notice and knowledge of the efforts of the Providence 
stockholders in 1910.99 
Whitten’s result was predicated on the fact that a stockholder who 
lacked knowledge would not be barred by the limitation period if he 
“acted promptly upon learning of the fraud.”100 
In contrast to Whitten, all the CVTI stockholders knew (or 
should have known) the underlying facts sufficient to bring a claim 
since at least January 2011 when the Citron Report was published, 
 
99 Whitten v. Dabney, 154 P. 312, 315-16 (Cal. 1915).  The California Official 
Reports Headnotes from the Whitten case, though non-binding, are instructive: “The 
provision of the statute of limitations applicable to such action by a stockholder is 
subdivision 4 of section 338 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that actions 
for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake must be commenced within three years, 
but that the cause of action is not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, 
by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.”  Whitten v. 
Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 622 (1915). 
100 Whitten, 154 P. at 315.  Whitten did not decide on the (hypothetical) rights of the 
1906 shareholders—it stated it was not deciding whether a shareholder who “waited 
too long” could be the one to initiate an action on behalf of the adversely dominated 
company.  Id. (“[E]ven if it can be said (and in saying it we do not decide it) that 
such a complaint . . . shows that the Plaintiff stockholder has waited too long . . . this 
does not operate as a bar to the corporate rights when prosecuted by another 
stockholder [who was not on inquiry notice of the claims]).”  Id. at 316. 
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disclosing same.  The Receiver’s claims, in contrast, were time-barred 
because the public, including all the shareholders, who did, in fact, sue, 
discovered or could have discovered the basis for the Receiver’s claims 
against the Auditors before the court appointed a receiver.101  The 
limitation periods for all the Receiver’s claims were triggered in 
January 2011, when the facts were publicly disclosed.102  The Receiver 
argued Judge Carney erroneously looked to California’s discovery rule 
rather than Whitten,103 but no court has held Whitten stands for the 
proposition for which the Receiver argued—nor has any court held 
knowledge and filing of multiple pleadings based on the same 
gravamen of facts should be ignored in assessing whether the Doctrine 
should resuscitate otherwise time-barred and, in Seiden, already 
adjudicated claims.  The Receiver’s interpretation of Whitten was just 
wrong. 
The Receiver’s second lead authority, San Leandro Canning 
Co., involved neither a receiver, nor parties with knowledge of a fraud, 
nor parties with an incentive and ability to sue for redress, let alone 
ones who actually did sue on the same facts.104  Like Whitten, San 
Leandro expressed a reasonable proposition, namely that where a 
company is dominated by fraudulent directors, the limitation period 
may, in some circumstances, be tolled—but it did not deal with the 
situation presented in Seiden, where the facts of the fraud were 
available to every shareholder and actually sued upon.105  San Leandro 
does not stand for the proposition that a receiver gets to revive time-
barred claims where domination does not prevent shareholders from 
obtaining knowledge of claims just because a receiver is appointed 
after the limitation period runs. 
 
101 Whitten did not involve a receiver trying to revive stale claims where people, 
knowing the same facts, had already sought redress in court.  Whitten did not even 
rely on the Doctrine.  It involved a statutory interpretation and application of the 
statute of limitations under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 338.  See 
Whitten, 154 P. at 315 (“[T]he right to prosecute the action is governed by the 
provisions of section 338, subdivision 4 . . . .”). 
102 See Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), at 14-15 & 
n.8, 2018 WL 6137618, at *7 n.8 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF No. 32. 
103 See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 24-25. 
104 See San Leandro Canning., Co v. Perillo, 295 P. 1026 (Cal. 1931). 
105 Id. 
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Plaintiff’s third lead authority, Damian v. A-Mark Precious 
Metals, Inc.,106  contains a correct statement of the rules governing the 
Doctrine: “In California, under the doctrine of adverse domination, a 
statute of limitations tolls when a claim arises from a director’s or 
employee’s defalcation and the wrongdoers’ control makes discovery 
impossible.”107  The Receiver omitted this quote from his citation and 
analysis of Damian.108  The CVTI executives’ wrongdoing did not 
“make discovery impossible” and the allegations which formed the 
gravamen of the Receiver’s Complaint were discovered and litigated—
the law is that tolling is appropriate where control prevents discovery 
of facts sufficient to seek redress, not where it does not.109 
The Receiver, in his opening appellate brief, argued he should 
be deemed to be like an “infant,” unable to discover facts that would 
allow him to timely sue to vindicate the CVTT shareholders’ rights, a 
 
106 2017 WL 6940515 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2017).  In citing Damian, the Receiver 
relied on a non-binding, inapposite authority.  Towards the end of the Damian 
decision, just prior to the conclusion, the following statement appears in bold: “This 
Order is not intended for publication.  Nor is it intended to be included in or submitted 
to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis.”  Id.  Nonetheless, District Judge 
Carney’s dismissal of the Receiver’s Complaint did address the Receiver’s reliance 
on Damian stating: 
Plaintiff’s reliance on Damian v. A-Mark Precious Metals, Inc., is 
misplaced. In Damian, the court found that the two directors controlled 
the receivership entities, which precluded the possibility of an action 
against them until the receiver was appointed. However, the court in 
Damian did not engage in any analysis regarding whether the facts of the 
alleged fraudulent transfer and fraud claims were discoverable prior to the 
receiver’s appointment, nor were there facts in the record suggesting that 
those claims were previously discoverable. 
Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018 WL 6137618 
at *7 n.9 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018) (internal citations omitted). 
107 Damian, 2017 WL 6940515 at *8, (quoting Smith v. Superior Ct., 266 Cal. Rptr. 
253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) and citing San Leandro Canning Co., 295 P. at 1028. 
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted)). 
108 See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at 6, 
16. 
109 See generally Beal v. Smith, 189 P. 341, 345 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920) (adverse 
domination does not toll limitations “against an innocent stockholder who was 
without knowledge of the fraud.”) (citing Whitten, 154 P. 312) (emphasis added); 
Pour Roy v. Gardner, 10 P. 2d 815, 819 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932) (emphasis added) 
(“[W]here the circumstances are such as to put a person of ordinary intelligence and 
prudence on inquiry, or where there are gross laches in not making any effort to 
discover the real facts which might have been discovered by the use of slight 
diligence, the statute of limitations cannot be avoided, and the knowledge which thus 
might have been obtained is imputed as of the time of the commission of the fraud.”). 
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form of “incapacity.”110  Unlike an infant who cannot bring an action 
to protect his or a company’s rights, however, the Defense argued the 
Receiver was appointed after the shareholders had already learned of 
the wrongdoing and after five cases litigated the facts.  The Defense 
argued, moreover, that whereas the “minority” of an infant reasonably 
justifies tolling so the infant, upon reaching majority, can make a 
reasoned decision whether to bring an action, no comparable 
“disability” should save the Receiver’s claims.111  Unlike an infant, 
with neither knowledge or ability to sue to protect his rights, CVTI 
shareholders had both knowledge and ability—and they sued.112  The 
Doctrine had been held inapplicable where a stockholder did discover 
the fraud,113  and that rule, the Defense argued, was wholly consistent 
with applicable discovery rules: 
Under the [California] discovery rule, the statute of 
limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or 
should suspect that her injury was caused by 
wrongdoing and that someone has done something 
wrong to her . . . . A plaintiff need not be aware of the 
specific facts necessary to establish the claim; that is a 
process contemplated by pretrial discovery . . . . So long 
 
110 See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 25-27. 
111 See Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 46, at 14-15. 
112 The Receiver relied on Goldberg v. Berry, 247 N.Y.S. 69, 75 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1930) to support his assertion that knowledge should not defeat Doctrine-based 
tolling but, in Goldberg, the court held the knowledge of one shareholder did not 
trigger the limitation period running as to shareholders who lacked that knowledge 
so persons unaware of a claim (due to domination) would not be compromised by 
the fact that one person with knowledge could have sued but chose not to do so, for 
his own reasons.  The Receiver also cited Allen v. Wilkerson, 396 S.W.2d 493, 501-
02 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) for the proposition that notice to shareholders does not start 
the limitation period running but, in Allen, one shareholder knew of the wrongdoing 
and could have brought a derivative suit.  The court held one shareholder’s 
knowledge and decision not to sue should not prejudice other shareholders, lacking 
such knowledge.  Id.  Allen, notably, relied on Goldberg and Whitten, both involving 
situations where one shareholder had knowledge, but others did not, and courts ruling 
knowledge of one shareholder should not compromise the rights of other 
shareholders, lacking such knowledge.  Id. 
113 See Burt v. Irvine Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 417 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (“[I]t is 
generally held that an action for fraud committed against a corporation is tolled for 
the period that those responsible for the fraud remain in control of the corporation.  
The principle does not apply after discovery of the fraud by a protesting stockholder 
. . . .”). 
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as a suspicion exists, it is clear that a plaintiff must go 
find the facts; she cannot wait for the facts to find her.114 
The Receiver argued, as he did in the trial court: “To the extent 
necessary, the Receiver asserts the doctrine of equitable tolling in this 
matter . . .” and that “the domination of CVVT by the executives who 
committed the bad acts with Defendants made discovery of the bad 
acts by the Receiver impossible until sometime after the appointment 
of the Receiver and the removal of the bad actors.”115  The Defense 
responded there should be no equitable tolling because the Receiver 
failed to plead facts which, if proved, supported his theory.116  
Citing Allen v. Ramsay, the court explained: 
A receiver occupies no better position than that which 
was occupied by the person or party for whom he acts 
and the receiver takes the property and the rights of one 
for whom he was appointed in the same condition and 
subject to the same equities as existed before his 
appointment and any defense good against the original 
party is good against the receiver.117 
In language particularly apposite, the court explained: 
The showing of excuse for late filing must be made in 
the complaint. Formal averments or general 
conclusions to the effect that the facts were not 
discovered until a stated date, and that the plaintiff 
could not reasonably have made an earlier discovery, 
are useless. The complaint must set forth specifically 
(1) the facts of the time and manner of discovery; and 
(2) the circumstances which excuse the failure to have 
made an earlier discovery.118 
 
114 Apple Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. Vavrinek, Trine, Day & Co., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
629, 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751 P.2d 923, 927-
28 (Cal. 1998)).  The defense noted other courts reached similar conclusions, citing 
In re Marvel Ent. Grp., Inc., 273 B.R. 58, 75 (D. Del. 2002) (holding that the 
Doctrine is essentially a corollary of the discovery rule—under the Doctrine—“the 
statute of limitations is allowed to run once someone has sufficient knowledge and 
ability to seek redress on the corporation's behalf.”). 
115 Receiver’s Complaint, supra note 5, at 6. 
116 See Mills v. Forestex Co., 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 286-87 (Cal Ct. App. 2003). 
117 Allen v. Ramsay, 4 Cal. Rptr. 575, 583 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960). 
118 Id. at 581. 
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The Complaint alleged no such circumstances or excuse,119 just that 
CVTI was dominated and the Receiver alleging that this, in itself, 
entitled him to equitable tolling.  He disregarded the rest of the rule, 
limiting Doctrine-based tolling to cases where defrauding party control 
was not negated by the possibility an informed and motivated 
shareholder or director could seek redress.120 
The Ninth Circuit began by observing the Receiver’s case 
turned on Doctrine interpretation which, as the trial court held, requires 
a showing of such substantial control by corrupt insiders that discovery 
of their wrongdoing is made impossible.121  It noted that the Ninth 
 
119 In Denholm v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 912 F.2d 357, 362 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth 
Circuit held that: “[t]o obtain the benefit of the late-discovery exception to the statute 
of limitations, the complaint must allege facts showing that the cause of action could 
not with reasonable diligence have been discovered prior to three years before the 
suit.”  To access adverse domination tolling, plaintiff must “show full, complete and 
exclusive control in the directors or officers charged”—and they can do so in just 
one way, namely, by “effectively negat[ing] the possibility that an informed 
stockholder or director could have induced the corporation to sue.”  Mosesian v. Peat, 
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 1984).  The Receiver, in his 
reply brief, euphemistically referred to the facts he pleaded as “similar” facts. See 
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 8-9.  But reading the paragraphs 
containing the same factual allegations, side by side, revealed that he had just 
parroted allegations from the pleadings of earlier filed class, derivative and SEC 
complaints. Appellee’s Supplemental Excerpts of the Record at Ex. A, Supp. ER 
007-10, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 Fed. Appx. 381 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-
56176). 
120 The Receiver argued that because his claims were neither “class claims” nor 
“derivative claims,” his claims, despite being based on the same facts, were not 
brought previously, see Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 9-11, and that 
he should be able to now bring his claims, even though they were previously 
interposed as the substantive predicate of at least five litigated complaints. See Notice 
of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint at Ex. A to Declaration of Lawrence A. 
Steckman, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal. 
June 8, 2018), ECF No. 23, Attach. No. 2.  The Auditors argued that no case has held 
that the adverse domination doctrine mandates that suit be brought in any particular 
form, e.g., a private, class or derivative pleading but, rather, only that facts sufficient 
to allow “redress” to be sought by a person with an incentive and ability to seek to 
remedy for damage the adverse domination has caused. Id.  The Defense further 
argued that the shareholders, in their previous class suit, could have sued for common 
law fraud, aiding and abetting a fiduciary breach and contract breach, the latter, 
potentially, as a third-party beneficiary of the subject written engagements, as well 
as on theories of negligence and gross negligence—they could and did seek “redress” 
based on the same facts as those upon which the Receiver’s claims were based. Id. 
121 Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 Fed. App’x 381, 382 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 
Smith v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Cal Ct. App. 1990); Admiralty 
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Circuit had previously held Doctrine-based tolling was unavailable 
where discovery of the alleged bad acts was possible, notwithstanding 
control by the wrongdoers.122  The Defense had cited California Union 
Insurance Co. v. American Diversified Savings Bank,123 a Ninth 
Circuit case interpreting the Doctrine under California law, which the 
Receiver argued was wrongly decided in light of (his interpretation of) 
Whitten,124 but the Receiver’s argument was rejected on procedural 
and interpretive grounds: 
Seiden argues that California Union was wrongly 
decided because it failed to follow Whitten v. Dabney, 
154 P. 312 (Cal. 1915), which he claims stands for the 
proposition that equitable tolling under the doctrine of 
adverse domination applies whenever a corporation is 
controlled by corrupt insiders. This argument fails for 
two reasons. First, even if we agreed with Seiden, a 
three-judge panel of this court is not at liberty to 
overrule California Union’s construction of California 
law. Second, we disagree that there is any tension 
between Whitten and California Union’s interpretation 
of the adverse domination doctrine. In Whitten, certain 
shareholders and directors conspired to defraud the 
corporation they controlled, and “sedulously 
 
Fund v. Peerless Ins. Co., 191 Cal. Rptr. 753, 758–59 (Ct. Ct. App. 1983); Burt v. 
Irvine Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 417 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965)). 
122 Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Am. Diversified Savings Bank, 948 F.2d 556, 565–66 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
123 948 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1991). 
124 Whitten v. Dabney, 154 P. 312 (Cal. 1915).  California federal courts have 
interpreted and applied the Doctrine in the same manner as California’s state courts.  
The Defense explained in its brief “[t]o exploit Doctrine tolling, the party bringing 
suit must have been unable to discover the wrongdoing and, so, been unable to seek 
redress to remedy adverse effects of domination.” Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra 
note 46, at 22.  See Cal. Union Ins. Co., 948 F.2d at 565 (noting this Doctrine “may 
be appropriate in situations where there is such domination and control as to preclude 
non-wrongdoing employees from discovery”) (emphasis added); Mosesian, 727 F.2d 
at 879 (holding that to establish equitable tolling under the adverse domination 
doctrine, a receiver must establish both: (1) exclusive control and domination by 
corrupt directors and (2) the inability of other shareholders or employees to discover 
the wrongdoing of the directors) (emphasis added); In re Marvel Ent. Grp., Inc., 273 
B.R. 58, 75 (D. Del. 2002) (under the Doctrine—“[T]he statute of limitations is 
allowed to run once someone has sufficient knowledge and ability to seek redress on 
the corporation's behalf.”). 
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concealed” their self-dealing from innocent 
shareholders. 154 P. at 315. On these facts, the 
California Supreme Court held that director 
malfeasance tolled the statute of limitations for an 
innocent shareholder’s claim, filed promptly after that 
shareholder’s discovery of the wrongdoing. Id. at 314–
16. That is perfectly consistent with California 
Union.125 
The Ninth Circuit then turned specifically to the facts before it, 
explaining and holding: 
[U]ncontroverted evidence demonstrates that, well 
within the statute of limitations, CVVT’s shareholders 
discovered or should have discovered the wrongdoing 
Seiden alleges. Specifically, in 2011, the same year a 
Citron Research report publicized CVVT’s alleged 
wrongdoing, shareholders sought redress in a class-
action lawsuit against both CVVT and Frazer Frost, as 
well as a derivative lawsuit against CVVT. In 2014, the 
SEC filed a fraud action against CVVT. As the district 
court observed, “[t]he SEC had the ability to uncover 
the facts relevant to Plaintiff’s causes of actions and 
make them public.” Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. 
8:18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018 WL 6137618, at *6 
(C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018). Indeed, all of these actions 
implicated Frazer Frost in the wrongdoing Seiden now 
alleges. Accordingly, the district court properly held 
that adverse domination did not toll Seiden’s claims. 
Cf. Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 
F.2d 873, 876–79 (9th Cir. 1984).126 
 
125 Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 Fed. App’x 381, 382 (9th Cir. 2020).  See Cal. 
Union Ins. Co., 948 F.2d at 565 (holding that the Doctrine “may be appropriate in 
situations where there is such domination and control as to preclude non-wrongdoing 
employees from discovery.”) (emphasis added).  The Doctrine, however, has never 
been held to resuscitate stale claims where knowledge is sufficient to allow a party 
with incentive to seek “redress” to do so.  Seiden, 796 Fed. App’x at 382-83. 
126 Seiden, 796 Fed. App’x at 383.  In Mosesian, the Ninth Circuit held that to 
establish equitable tolling under the adverse domination doctrine, a receiver must 
establish both: (1) exclusive control and domination by corrupt directors and (2) the 
inability of other shareholders or employees to discover the wrongdoing of the 
directors). 727 F.2d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 1984).  The Receiver relied heavily on 
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Turning to the Receiver’s in pari delicto argument, the Ninth 
Circuit explained and held: 
The district court also properly held that CVVT 
shareholders were able to seek redress for the 
wrongdoing Seiden alleges here. Seiden argues that 
notwithstanding Frazer Frost’s wrongdoing, 
shareholders had no ability to sue Frazer Frost prior 
to his appointment as Receiver because Frazer Frost 
would have had an ironclad in pari delicto defense. 
Seiden is incorrect. Even if Frazer Frost had a 
plausible in pari delicto defense against derivative 
claims brought by CVVT shareholders, defenses—
hypothetical or otherwise—do not toll otherwise 
applicable statutes of limitations. The district court 
correctly determined that Seiden’s failure to plead 
adverse domination could not be cured by any 
amendment.127 
Had derivative claims against the Auditors been barred by the in pari 
delicto doctrine, it would have resulted in a windfall to the (alleged) 
wrongdoing auditor which would have created a gross injustice, 
contrary to the policies underlying the equitable in pari delicto 
doctrine.  Preventing shareholders in a derivative action from 
recovering from a third-party due to the wrongdoing of directors in 
cahoots with the third party would have been a miscarriage of justice. 
IV. KIRSCHNER V. KPMG: APPLICABILITY OF THE IN PARI 
DELICTO DEFENSE TO A SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION 
 
Rosenfeld v. Zimmer, 254 P.2d 137, 138-40 (Cal Dist. Ct. App. 1953), which 
involved a fraudulent transaction in which the plaintiff shareholders, Victor and 
Morris Rosenfeld, had unclean hands, along with defendant corporation Euclid 
Properties, Inc., which falsified loan documents to obtain funds to repay loans made 
by the Rosenfeld plaintiffs and another shareholder (Mrs. Coren).  Rosenfeld did not 
involve adverse domination, but, rather, a fraudulent scheme involving the 
shareholders, themselves, who were bringing the derivative action. Id. (“[C]ause of 
action was barred by the doctrine of unclean hands of plaintiffs [Victor and Morris 
Rosenfeld] and defendant Euclid, the corporation on whose behalf plaintiffs 
instituted the present action . . . [s]ince the evidence disclosed that plaintiffs and 
defendant Euclid had intended to and actually did misrepresent the facts to the 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company in obtaining a loan from it, by which 
they hoped to benefit, they came into a court of equity with unclean hands.”). 
127 Seiden, 796 F. App'x at 383 (emphasis added). 
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FILED AGAINST AN OUTSIDE AUDITOR 
Interpretation of the adverse domination doctrine urged by the 
Receiver, were it adopted, would allow for and encourage collusion 
between a receiver and shareholders who failed to act within the 
limitations period, for their own purposes.  Shareholders with actual 
knowledge of wrongdoing and the motivation to seek redress could 
elide the statute of limitations by seeking appointment of a receiver 
who could litigate claims, about which the shareholders knew, but 
failed to act, notwithstanding all the policies underlying why limitation 
periods exist,128 and regardless of how stale the claims had become.  
This is not the law and never has been the law, as the trial and Ninth 
Circuit decisions in Seiden make clear. 
Apparently recognizing this, the Receiver fell back on the 
argument that a shareholder’s derivative action against the Auditors 
would not have been brought because the shareholders would have 
 
128 Katharine F. Nelson, The 1990 Federal “Fallback” Statute of Limitations: 
Limitations by Default, 72 NEB. L. REV. 454, 464-66 (1993) (quoting Agency 
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987)) (“Statutes 
of limitations are designed to protect defendants by giving them repose. Defendants 
do not have to live their entire lives fearing that they will be sued for past deeds. As 
a result, time-bars help stabilize commercial and property transactions. With a known 
period of liability, defendants can arrange their personal and commercial lives 
accordingly. They can also collect and preserve evidence against the possibility of 
suit while the evidence is fresh. Moreover, time-bars protect defendants from unfair 
surprise and the prejudice of having to defend themselves years after the claim arose 
when the evidence and witnesses may be scarce or lost. Statutes of limitations thus 
force plaintiffs to assert their claims in a timely fashion when the evidence and 
witnesses' memories are fresh. Periods of limitations also assist the courts, and thus 
society, by preserving resources and promoting the legitimacy of the judicial process. 
They play a major role in reducing the courts' crowded dockets by deterring litigants 
from filing most time-barred claims. Untimely claims that are filed can usually be 
dismissed in a pretrial motion. As a result, the courts do not have to waste valuable 
time and resources litigating stale claims. More importantly, statutes of limitations 
promote accuracy and fairness. Through time-bars the courts avoid dealing with 
unreliable witnesses and stale, or even false, evidence. Discussing the policies 
underlying statutes of limitations, the Supreme Court has said: ‘A federal cause of 
action “brought at any distance of time” would be “utterly repugnant to the genius of 
our laws.” Just determinations of fact cannot be made when, because of the passage 
of time, the memories of witnesses have faded, or evidence is lost. In compelling 
circumstances, even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be 
forgotten.’ Finally, to the extent that the public perceives that time-bars prevent 
frivolous claims and promote accuracy, they also help preserve the public's 
perception of the courts' legitimacy.”). 
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known they would have lost and, therefore, that knowledge would have 
negated their motivation to seek derivative suit redress.  Per the 
Receiver’s argument, CVTI shareholders’ potential knowledge of the 
wrongdoing by the controlling directors (and the alleged parallel 
wrongdoing of the Auditors) should not terminate the tolling of the 
limitations period because, in their view, a successful shareholder’s 
derivative action was never feasible.129 
Both Judge Carney and the Ninth Circuit rejected the 
Receiver’s argument.  Judge Carney found that the Receiver’s theory 
that the Auditors could dismiss an derivative action based on in pari 
delicto was speculative and contrary to good policy—after all, in that 
context, the Auditors, who allegedly aided and abetted the fraud, 
would be able to escape liability for claims brought, albeit derivatively, 
by the victims of the fraud, namely the shareholders.130  Judge Carney 
did not definitively determine that an in pari delicto defense in a 
derivative action brought against the auditors would have failed.  
Rather, he found the Receiver’s assertions “too speculative to assume 
that the defense of in pari delicto would apply to CVVT’s 
shareholders. . . . [And therefore, determination of the viability of an 
in pari delicto defense] would essentially require a mini-trial on the 
merits of another litigation, before the Court could address the merits 
of this action.”131 
In other contexts, such as a legal malpractice actions, for 
example, a court necessarily does engage in what amounts to a mini-
trial or a case-within-a case to resolve an essential claim element, i.e., 
whether an attorney’s negligence was the “but for” cause of a 
plaintiff’s injury or loss.  However, an important distinction between 
the CVVT litigation and a malpractice action exists.  The mini-trial in 
which Judge Carney refused to engage would not have resolved an 
essential element of the Receiver’s claims -- only whether the Receiver 
 
129 The Receiver also asserted that the prior (dismissed) securities class action 
lawsuits (which the defense established were based on the same gravamen of facts), 
were of no moment. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 10-11.  He 
urged that because they were brought by shareholders, in their individual capacities, 
rather than derivatively on CVTI’s behalf, they were really different claims. Id.  The 
defense responded that the issue was not whether they were nominated “class” or 
“derivative” but whether the factual predicate underlying the claims, however 
nominated, was the same. See Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 46, at 16-20. 
130 Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018 WL 
6137618, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018). 
131 Id. at *8-9. 
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could assert those claims.  This determination, as Judge Carney noted, 
would have been necessary to resolve “before the Court could address 
the merits of this action.”132  The Ninth Circuit agreed with Judge 
Carney, stating that even if the auditors had a plausible in pari delicto 
defense against derivative claims brought by CVVT shareholders, 
defenses, hypothetical or otherwise do not toll otherwise applicable 
statutes of limitations.133 
The Receiver, seeking a rehearing en banc, asserted that he 
should be granted “a panel rehearing of this case to properly consider 
the role that in pari delicto played in the Receiver’s argument, as well 
as how it showed the shareholders, even with knowledge, had no 
ability to bring their derivative claims . . . .”134  The Ninth Circuit 
denied the Receiver’s Petition for a rehearing in a unanimous 3-0 
decision.135  Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the trial judge resolved 
whether the Receiver’s assertion that the Auditors would have been 
able to successfully assert an in pari delicto defense to any shareholder 
derivative claims.  The Receiver’s assertions were deemed so 
speculative and attenuated, as to not warrant a mini-trial to determine 
whether the Court should address the pleading merits.136  It held the 
Receiver’s allegations were insufficient to warrant tolling of the 
otherwise applicable statute of limitations.137 
The Seiden trial and appeal courts refused to assess the 
likelihood that the Receiver might have prevailed on his hypothetical 
in pari delicto defense, to try to avoid a limitations dismissal. 
However, in other contexts, courts have evaluated hypothetical in pari 
delicto defenses with, as commentators have observed, varying and 
inconsistent results.138 
The issue of whether an accountant can be liable to his own 
client, in negligence, or contract for failure to perform his obligations 
with the implied obligation of due care frequently arises.  Bankruptcy 
trustees, receivers or other persons who step into the client’s shoes, 
including, for example, the FDIC or SIPC, often aggressively assert 
claims.  The theory frequently proffered is that, but for the accountant's 
 
132 Id. at *9. 
133 Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 F. App’x 381, 383 (9th Cir. 2020). 
134 Plaintiff-Appellant’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 11, 
Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 Fed. App’x 381 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-561767). 
135 Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4005 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2020). 
136 Seiden, 2018 WL 6137618, at *9. 
137 Seiden, 796 F. App'x at 383. 
138 Swanson, supra note 6, at 44-48. 
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negligence, the company would not have become insolvent, and the 
accountant's negligence, therefore, was the cause of (or contributed to) 
the company's downfall.139  This commonly asserted theory was 
propounded aggressively by the Receiver in support of CVTI’s claims 
against its auditors.140  In such cases, where a corporation or a third-
party who has stepped into the corporation’s shoes sues an auditor, the 
auditor will often argue that its alleged negligence or fraud was the 
result of the corporation’s (or company officer’s) fraud, thus giving 
rise to an in pari delicto defense.141 
In Kirschner v. KPMG LLP,142 the New York Court of Appeals 
held that the in pari delicto doctrine would bar a shareholder derivative 
action, filed under New York law, against an outside auditor sued for 
professional malpractice or negligence based on the auditor's failure to 
detect a corporation fraud.143  The Receiver did not cite Kirschner 
before either the California District Court or the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in support of his assertion that a shareholder derivative action 
against the Auditors would have been futile due to the Auditors’ ability 
to raise the in pari delicto defense.144  It is not clear whether the 
Receiver’s failure to cite Kirschner was an oversight, or whether it was 
intentional.  Kirschner suggests that acceptance of the in pari delicto 
defense under the circumstances of that case was actually contingent 
on the absence of adverse domination.  Kirschner involved 
certification of questions to the New York Court of Appeals from the 
Second Circuit and Delaware Supreme Court.  The question from 
Delaware was:  
Would the doctrine of in pari delicto bar a derivative 
claim under New York law where a corporation sues its 
outside auditor for professional malpractice or 
 
139 Id. at 44. 
140 See Receiver’s Complaint, supra note 5, at 13-15. 
141 Swanson, supra note 6, at 44-45. 
142 938 N.E.2d 941 (N.Y. 2010). 
143 Id. at 945. 
144 As set forth above, CVTI’s shareholders did file a shareholder derivative action 
against the corporation for the same activities that were the subject of the Seiden 
litigation.  The shareholders, however, did not seek relief against the auditors in the 
derivative action, which was eventually voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice and 
without explanation.  See Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Complaint at Exs. 
J-K to Declaration of Lawrence A. Steckman, Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. 
SACV 18-00588-CJC (KESx) (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018), ECF No. 23, Attach. Nos. 
11-12. 
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negligence based on the auditor's failure to detect fraud 
committed by the corporation; and, the outside auditor 
did not knowingly participate in the corporation's fraud, 
but instead, failed to satisfy professional standards in its 
audits of the corporation's financial statements?145 
The question the Delaware Supreme Court certified was answered in 
the affirmative.146 
The New York Court of Appeals would have applied the in pari 
delicto doctrine, but with a caveat that: “the certified question should 
be answered ‘Yes,’ assuming the adverse interest exception does not 
apply.”147  The adverse interest exception, as interpreted by Kirschner, 
applies to situations in which the agent or adverse actor has “totally 
abandoned his principal's interests and [was] acting entirely for his 
own or another's purpose.”148  The reason that the Court of Appeals 
added this caveat is because it chose to apply general principles of 
agency which normally bind a principal to its agent’s actions intended 
to benefit a company.  The Court of Appeals held that “[t]o allow a 
corporation to avoid the consequences of corporate acts simply 
because an employee performed them with his personal profit in mind 
would enable the corporation to disclaim, at its convenience, virtually 
every act its officers undertake.”149  Therefore, under New York law, 
even if a corporate officer’s actions have an ultimate adverse impact 
on the corporation, if the officer’s initial intent was to benefit the 
corporation, the adverse interest doctrine will not apply.150 
 
145 Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 949 (emphasis omitted). 
146 Id. at 945. 
147 Id. at 959 (emphasis added). 
148 Id. at 952. 
149 Id. 
150 While many courts have considered auditor liability in this context, approaches to 
the issue are varied. Some courts, such as the Kirschner court, have followed Cenco, 
Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982), relying on tort-liability 
objectives.  These courts impute the corporate officers' fraud to the corporation if the 
fraud led to any short-term benefit and, relying on this imputation, preclude claims 
against a corporation's auditor.  Other courts have focused primarily on agency law 
principle, precluding a collusive auditor—but not a negligent auditor—from raising 
an in pari delicto defense.  See Shepard, supra note 4, at 317.  Because a third party 
who does not deal with a principal in good faith has no basis in agency law to invoke 
imputation, so the argument goes, it has no basis to benefit from an in pari delicto 
defense.  Still other courts have used a combination of both these approaches or have 
simply held that, as a policy matter, auditors may not invoke imputation. See id. 
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Had the Receiver relied on Kirschner and had the California 
courts followed the principles it enunciated; he would have been 
placed in a box from which he could not have escaped.  For the 
Receiver to establish the availability of an in pari delicto defense, he 
would have had to negate the CVTI shareholders’ ability and 
motivation to seek derivative relief against the Auditors—in other 
words, he would also have had to establish there was no adverse 
domination by the officers who committed the fraud.  This would have 
undermined his argument for tolling the limitation period which was 
premised on his allegation that CVTI had been adversely dominated so 
that the alleged fraud could not have been discovered until after his 
appointment.  He would have had to negate his entire rational for 
tolling, namely, adverse domination. 
Auditors are frequently sued for failing to detect the fraud of 
corporate officers.  Such suits can be brought as shareholder derivative 
actions, or by Bankruptcy Trustees or by court-appointed Receivers 
and, as commentators have explained: 
The auditor in this scenario has a powerful defense in 
its corner: in pari delicto. Under accepted agency 
principles, the knowledge of a corporate officer is 
imputed to the corporation and the corporation is 
deemed to have that knowledge. Likewise, imputation 
makes the corporation legally responsible for an 
officer's fraud. The officer's fraud is, in law, the 
corporation's fraud which makes the corporation a 
wrongdoer in front of the court. The defense of in pari 
delicto prevents a wrongdoer from seeking redress 
against another alleged wrongdoer. Because the 
corporation's creditors or shareholders bring their claim 
on behalf of the corporation, they “step into the shoes” 
of the corporation and any defense that can be asserted 
against the corporation may be asserted against them. 
In the corporate fraud context, then, these doctrines 
work together to immunize auditors from liability.151 
In the Seiden litigation, resolution of the statute of limitations 
issue on the pleadings was possible because multiple litigations, 
including class and derivative litigations, had been filed, including 
class claims against the Auditors, and they were resolved within the 
 
151 Shepard, supra note 4, at 277-78. 
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statute of limitations and the Receiver’s claims arose from the same 
gravamen of operative fact.  This obviated the need to determine 
whether the auditors could have raised an in pari delicto defense if a 
derivative claim had been filed against them because they had the 
opportunity to seek redress for the same violations and pursued 
redress.  The in pari delicto defense would not have been available to 
the Auditors against the Receiver, if he had been allowed to proceed 
with his claims, because the Ninth Circuit has held the in pari delicto 
defense is not available as a defense to claims brought by a receiver 
appointed to take over the affairs of an adversely dominated 
corporation.152 
However, the question the Receiver raised was whether the in 
pari delicto defense would have been available to the Auditors in a 
shareholder derivative action and, if so, would that possibility have 
negated shareholder motivation to bring such an action, allowing the 
Receiver to bring an action, otherwise untimely, for lack of the 
shareholders’ “incentive” to sue.153  Had the rule in Kirschner been 
followed, the in pari delicto defense would have been available to the 
Auditors—but only if adverse domination was not present.  The 
possibility of availability of an in pari delicto defense in a 
(hypothetical) shareholders derivative suit would have required a fact-
sensitive determination.154 
 
152 See generally Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d 17, 19 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (finding that defenses based on unclean hands or inequitable conduct do 
not generally apply against a party's receiver because the receiver does not step into 
the party’s shoes but “is thrust into those shoes”). 
153 See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 46, at 17, 29-33. 
154 See Swanson, supra note 6, at 46. 
It is clear that there is substantial confusion in this area of the law and that 
judges continue to struggle with in pari delicto and other “Cenco”-type 
defenses.  When such a defense is rejected, and the suit is allowed, the 
theory of damages is generally one of “deepening insolvency,” i.e., that 
had the fraud been uncovered earlier, the company at a minimum would 
have been much less deeply insolvent, owing less to its creditors. Even 
this theory has generated controversy and confusion. For example, the 
Third Circuit recently held there was a cause of action for "deepening 
insolvency" in favor of a bankruptcy trustee when the underlying 
challenged conduct was fraudulent (as opposed to merely negligent). But 
the Delaware Chancery Court rejected that view, concluding, instead, that 
“deepening insolvency” was not an independent cause of action, but 
merely a theory of damages when there was another available liability 
theory. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In Seiden, the Receiver relied heavily on Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corp. v. O'Melveny & Myers,155 for the proposition that 
defenses based on unclean hands or inequitable conduct do not 
generally apply against a receiver.156  Court appointed receivers have 
often been treated differently from trustees in bankruptcy in this 
regard.  United States courts have generally interpreted Bankruptcy 
Code section 541 as limiting a trustee's rights to those of the 
corporation as they existed at the time the bankruptcy proceeding 
commenced.  Accordingly, a bankruptcy trustee -- unlike a court 
appointed receiver -- may be subject to any in pari delicto defense that 
could have been asserted against the bankrupt corporation.157 
O’Melveny has been cited with approval by courts in several 
circuits, including the Second Circuit.158  The Second Circuit itself has 
approved of the principles articulated in O’Melveny allowing a 
receiver to pursue fraudulent conveyance claims on behalf of a 
 
155 61 F.3d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1995). 
156 See Shepard, supra note 4, at 316-17.  Courts often rely on policy and fairness 
arguments to conclude that auditors should not be immune from liability. 
157 Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 6, at 1257. 
In the case of a trustee in bankruptcy, U.S. courts have generally 
interpreted section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code to limit a trustee's rights 
to those of the corporation as they existed at the time of the 
commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding.  Accordingly, if the 
bankrupt corporation had participated in the wrongdoing, it would on the 
date of commencement of the bankruptcy have been disabled from 
pursuing claims against confederate wrongdoers on in pari delicto 
grounds. The trustee, stepping into those shoes, suffers that same 
disability. Court-appointed receivers, however, are a different matter. 
Receivers are not limited by section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, and in 
pursuing claims of the corporation against other wrongdoers, receivers are 
generally not hampered by the in pari delicto defenses raised by those third 
parties. 
Id. 
158 See Adelphia Comms. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 365 B.R. 24, 56 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“With the guilty insiders having been displaced before the filing 
date, there is not even an arguable statutory or caselaw basis upon which to ignore 
the fairness considerations articulated in . . . O'Melveny.”); see also Colonial 
BancGroup, Inc. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, No. 2:11-cv-746-BJR, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 175086, at *18 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 18, 2017); Evans v. Armenta, No. 14-
329-GFVT, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194540, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 26, 2016); Javitch 
v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 408 F. Supp. 2d 531, 537 (N.D. Ohio 
2006); In re NJ Affordable Homes Corp., No. 05-60442 (DHS), 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 
4798, at *110-11 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2013). 
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corporation which had been adversely dominated.159  Unless statutory 
requirements, such as Bankruptcy Code section 541 compel otherwise, 
principles of fairness should be the main determinant of whether an in 
pari delicto defense is applicable, as well as whether the limitation 
period should be tolled because of adverse domination. 160  The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed Judge Carney’s decision161 and, with respect to the in 
pari delicto issue held, without citing case authority, that: “even if [the 
auditors] had a plausible in pari delicto defense against derivative 
claims brought by CVVT shareholders, defenses—hypothetical or 
otherwise—do not toll otherwise applicable statutes of limitations.”162  
The dissent in Kirschner explained that innocent shareholders bringing 
derivative actions should be afforded even greater protection and that 
“the weight of the equities favors allowing suits such as these to go 
forward to deter active wrongdoing or negligence by auditors and 
similar professionals.”163  The dissent seems to be articulating similar 
 
159 Eberhard v. Marcu, 530 F.3d 122, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing and quoting Scholes 
v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1995)) (“The appointment of the receiver 
removed the wrongdoer from the scene. The corporations were no more Douglas's 
evil zombies. Freed from his spell they became entitled to the return of the moneys . 
. . that Douglas had made the corporations divert to unauthorized purposes.”). 
160 O’Melveny articulated an exception to the general rule that “[a] receiver occupies 
no better position than that which was occupied by the person or party for whom he 
acts . . . and any defense good against the original party is good against the receiver.” 
61 F.3d at 19 (quoting Allen v. Ramsay, 4 Cal. Rptr. 575, 583 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1960)).  That exception applied to the inapplicability of an in pari delicto defense.  It 
did not allow a receiver to revive an already expired statute of limitations.  In Seiden, 
the California District Court and the Ninth Circuit applied fairness principles, 
consistent with California case law, holding the limitation period should not be 
equitably tolled, on the grounds of adverse domination, because CVTI shareholders 
learned of the alleged wrongdoing of the corporate directors and had the opportunity 
and motivation to seek redress.  See Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, No. SACV 18-
00588-CJC (KESx), at 12, 2018 WL 6137618, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), ECF 
No. 32; Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 F. App'x 381, 383 (9th Cir. 2020). 
161 In the absence of any directly applicable California law on the issue of whether 
an in pari delicto defense would have been applicable to a shareholder derivative 
action brought by CVTI’s shareholders, District Judge Carney applied principles of 
fairness and common sense to conclude that it was unlikely that the Auditors could 
successfully invoke an in pari delicto defense against a derivative action filed in 
behalf of CVTI by innocent shareholders who, themselves, were allegedly victims of 
the fraud perpetrated by the wrongdoing directors. Transcript of Proceedings, supra 
note 55, at 17-18. 
162 Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 F. App'x 381, 383 (9th Cir. 2020). 
163 Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 964 (N.Y. 2010) (Ciparick, J., 
dissenting). 
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fairness concerns to those  raised by Judge Carney who, plainly, could 
not conceive of the fairness of punishing innocent shareholders for the 
acts of corporation-adverse directors.164  In Seiden, it was clear from 
the pleading and documentary evidence that the CVTI shareholders 
had prior knowledge of the misconduct underlying the Receiver’s 
claims.  As a result, no limitation period tolling was appropriate as of 
the time knowledge of the subject wrongdoing was acquired.  In 
similar cases, dismissal on the pleading should be appropriate—
particularly where, as in Seiden, the applicable limitations period had 
expired prior to a receiver’s filing. 
Both Judge Carney and the Ninth Circuit appear to have relied 
on their sense of fairness in dismissing the Receiver’s pleading, 
without leave to replead, notwithstanding Judge Carney’s recognition 
that further fact-finding might have allowed the Court to definitively 
determine whether CVVT’s shareholders would have been subject to 
an in pari delicto defense.  A three-judge panel, nevertheless, 
unanimously denied the Receiver’s subsequent application for a 
rehearing and then, a rehearing en banc to reconsider his in pari delicto 
arguments.165 
Denial of the Receiver’s in pari delicto arguments may reflect 
the dearth of on point case decisions.166  It was certainly possible to 
conduct a case-within-a-case analysis and, in cases involving, for 
example, professional malpractice, such analysis may be necessary to 
determine the damages element of a claim.  Whether to conduct a case-
within-a-case analysis involves policy considerations.  If plaintiff can 
show the shareholders would have been dissuaded from seeking 
redress through a derivative action because claims in that action would 
be subject to an in pari delicto defense, liberal pleading rules militate 
against dismissal.167  Yet, allowing an adverse domination predicated 
 
164 Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 55, at 17-18. 
165 Seiden v. Frazer Frost LLC, No. 18-56176, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4005 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 10, 2020). 
166 Seiden v. Frazer Frost LLC, No. 18-00588-CJC (KESx), 2018 WL 6137618, at 
*6 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018), aff’d, 796 F. App’x 381 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2020), reh’g 
en banc denied, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4005 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2020). 
167 Significantly, the Receiver did not plead that CVTI shareholders had no motive 
to seek redress due to in pari delicto.  However, after dismissal of his pleading he 
was not afforded an opportunity to amend his complaint to include this allegation. 
See Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP, 796 F. App'x 381, 383 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[t]he district 
court correctly determined that Seiden’s failure to plead adverse domination could 
not be cured by any amendment.”). 
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pleading to go forward based on the thin reed of a hypothetical in pari 
delicto defense being asserted in a hypothetical action seems prima 
facia to run counter to judicial economy principles and the unfairness 
of defendant having to defend stale claims.168 
In some contexts, a statute of repose may be applicable, rather 
than a statute of limitations and the latter may immunize a defendant 
from liability even where the potential claim against him could not 
have been  discovered until after a limitation period elapsed.169  Seiden 
involved application of a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose 
but, ultimately, the equities of subjecting the auditor defendants to 
having to defend the Receiver’s stale claims, along with principles of 
judicial economy, may have seemed too much—and the justification 
in their minds might have been analogous to a repose-justified 
outcome.  Given the same gravamen of alleged facts had been 
previously pleaded and adjudicated, in several cases, and those cases, 
having been dismissed with prejudice, it may have seemed 
unreasonable to give the Receiver an opportunity to try to re-plead 
claims based on those same facts, where his argument was based on 




168 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987) 
(“In compelling circumstances, even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins 
may be forgotten.”). 
169 See P. Stolz Family P'ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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